Dam Near Disaster: The State of Michigan’s Aging Dam Infrastructure
Max Stoneman
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2020, the Edenville Dam failed, causing catastrophic flooding in Midland, Michigan.[1] More than 11,000 residents were displaced from their homes along the Tittabawassee River.[2] The disaster affected over 4,000 structures, causing over $245 million in property damage.[3] While there were no recorded casualties, the emergency revealed deep structural flaws in Michigan’s dam safety regime.
This blog reviews the landscape of dam safety in Michigan, including the key institutional actors that shape how dams are regulated and maintained. It then examines the initiatives that have emerged in response to the Edenville disaster. Finally, it considers the lingering questions that remain as Michigan continues to grapple with its aging infrastructure.
II. LANDSCAPE OVERVIEW
To understand the future of dams in Michigan, it is necessary to examine their current condition and the major actors shaping the state’s dam safety regime.
A. Dams in Michigan
There are currently over 2,500 dams in Michigan.[4] Many of these dams were constructed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to power mills or hydroelectric plants.[5] Today, these dams remain primarily for aesthetic or recreational purposes.[6] However, they have also become a significant liability: 67% of Michigan’s dams have reached their intended 50-year design life, and 271 are over 100 years old.[7]
At the time of the disaster, the Edenville Dam was nearly a century old and had been repeatedly flagged by regulators as being unsafe.[8] The dam’s spillway lacked the capacity necessary to pass the probable maximum flood, meaning the dam could not safely discharge water during a major flood event.[9] While this vulnerability was not the sole reason for the dam’s failure—there were also weaknesses in the embankment—it was a well-documented deficiency that contributed to the structural failure of the aging dam.[10]
B. Key Players
There are four key institutional actors that shape Michigan’s dam safety regime.
1. State Legislature
The Michigan state legislature is responsible for developing the state’s dam safety framework. The central statute is the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (“NREPA”).[11] Part 315 of NREPA regulates the construction, repair, reconstruction, maintenance, operation, and removal of dams over six feet in height where over five acres are impounded during the design flood.[12] Part 307 provides for establishing and maintaining legal lake levels and establishing special assessment districts to fund construction, inspection, maintenance, and repair of dams.[13] While this statute provides meaningful structure to the state’s dam safety regime, the legislature has delegated primary implementation authority to the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (“EGLE”).
2. State Regulators
EGLE is responsible for ensuring that the state’s dams are “properly constructed, inspected and maintained, and that the owners have adequately prepared for potential emergencies.”[14] Inspection reports are required every three to five years and are based on a dam’s assigned safety rating.[15]
While these state-level efforts have been useful, there has previously been tension between EGLE and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). Prior to the Edenville disaster, the dam was licensed by FERC, which exercised primary regulatory control over it for several years.[16] However, FERC would eventually revoke the license, shifting control over to EGLE.[17] This shift left EGLE in a vulnerable position, as transferring information from one agency to the other proved cumbersome.[18] Unfortunately, the abrupt transition ultimately limited the role EGLE could play in mitigating the eventual disaster.[19]
3. Legacy Utilities & Private Equity Firms
Around 800 of the state’s regulated dams are privately owned.[20] Of these 800 dams, most have been owned by legacy utilities such as Consumers Energy.[21] However, this shifted over the past few decades. Recently, Consumers Energy has made a concentrated effort to sell off the over 90 dams it once held.[22] As legacy utilities have transitioned to become sellers, private equity firms have become willing buyers.[23] This shift has raised serious questions about whether these financially motivated groups will have the long-term institutional capacity to fund necessary safety upgrades on century-old infrastructure.
The Edenville disaster serves as a cautionary example of what can go wrong under private ownership. In the years leading up to the incident, the dam was owned by Boyce Hydro, LLC, a private entity that repeatedly disregarded federal safety mandates before ultimately declaring bankruptcy.[24] Over the course of more than 14 years, FERC cited the company for persistent noncompliance, including failure to upgrade spillways and adhere to required safety directives under its hydroelectric license.[25] Despite repeated warnings, Boyce Hydro failed to make the necessary improvements, prompting FERC to ultimately revoke the dam’s hydropower generating license in 2018.[26] However, the company continued to operate the dam under state oversight without remedying the identified safety deficiencies. Facing a wave of litigation related to the disaster, the company filed for bankruptcy the following August.[27]
4. Municipal Governments
While municipal governments are left to address the issues posed by flooding and the associated recovery efforts, they have perhaps the most limited role in formal dam oversight. They generally are not players in the permitting process and lack independent inspection authority under NREPA. Local governments ultimately rely heavily on the other actors to ensure their communities’ interests are being protected. Only after disaster strikes are municipalities thrust into action, trading their limited formal role for an outsized burden of response and recovery.
After the Edenville Dam broke, officials from Midland and Gladwin counties were responsible for coordinating mass evacuations and debris cleanup.[28] Additionally, a special assessment district was created to cover recovery costs, requiring property owners to pay approximately $217 million over a 40-year period.[29] This outcome reflects a fundamental asymmetry in Michigan’s dam safety regime: when a dam fails, municipalities are tasked with paying for catastrophes they had no meaningful power to prevent.
III. RECENT INITIATIVES
In the years since the Edenville failure, Michigan’s key institutional players have taken steps to address the vulnerabilities it exposed. These initiatives represent meaningful progress, though significant gaps remain.
A. State Legislature
The Michigan state legislature has made slow but promising progress over the last several years. Most notably, the Michigan House of Representatives introduced HB 5485 on January 29, 2026.[30] This bill, sitting in the House Natural Resources and Tourism Committee at the time of writing, expands “inspection requirements, strengthen[s] state power to order drawdowns or emergency action and require[s] dam owners to demonstrate they can afford long-term upkeep.”[31]
B. State Regulators
EGLE has taken several meaningful administrative steps since 2020.The agency’s Dam Safety unit has expanded from two full-time engineers to eight since the disaster.[32] Additionally, the department has also created the Dam Risk Reduction Grant Program (“DRRGP”), which provides funding to dam owners “for repair, alteration, or removal activities necessary to address risk associated with publicly or privately owned dams.”[33]
C. Legacy Utilities & Private Equity Firms
Legacy utilities such as Consumers Energy appear to have prioritized selling their aging dams rather than rehabilitating them. In September 2025, Consumers Energy announced a purchase agreement to sell its 13 hydroelectric dams along five Michigan rivers to Confluence Hydro, an affiliate of Hull Street Energy, LLC, for one dollar each.[34] This transaction is still pending approval from FERC and the Michigan Public Service Commission.[35] Whether Confluence Hydro will have the financial capacity and institutional knowledge to safely maintain these aging structures remains an open and contested question.
D. Municipal Governments
While municipal governments do not have the same sweeping authority as the other key players, some have taken proactive steps in the wake of Edenville to improve local emergency preparedness and community resilience. For example, Midland County has joined with neighboring Gladwin County to support the Four Lakes Task Force, a nonprofit organization that administers and oversees the maintenance and operations of the area’s dams and lakes.[36] Since the Edenville disaster, the organization has raised funds and engaged in several substantive construction projects.[37]
IV. LINGERING QUESTIONS
Several key questions remain regarding dam safety in the state.
First, the role of private equity remains largely uncertain. Will these groups dedicate the funds necessary to maintain the aging dams? Or will they encounter the same financial pressures as Boyce Hydro, ultimately leading to bankruptcy and catastrophe?[38] With high stakes for both public and private actors, this dynamic is being closely monitored. New dam owners will be tested on their ability to make sustained, long-term capital investments in infrastructure that often generates limited returns. Meanwhile, municipalities are left to brace for the consequences if those investments fall short.
Second, it is unclear whether HB 5485 will clear the requisite hurdles in the legislative process. A similar piece of legislation was brought forward in 2020 and ultimately died in committee.[39] While the bipartisan support of HB 5485 is promising, the bill still has a long way to go before it becomes law.
Third, funding for statewide dam removals and improvements remains a persistent concern. While the DRRGP has been beneficial, there is some worry it will fall short of what is necessary to implement required safety measures.[40] In 2016, the state’s 21st Century Infrastructure Commission reported that Michigan would need around $227 million in state funding over 20 years to adequately support the maintenance and removal of aging dams.[41] To date, the DRRGP has only disbursed approximately $44 million, leaving a meaningful gap between the projected need and available funding.[42]
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the years since Edenville have brought meaningful but incomplete progress on dam safety in Michigan. The state legislature and its primary regulatory authority have both taken steps to strengthen the state’s dam regulation. However, the key structural issues still require further attention, with many pertinent questions left unanswered.
Ultimately, the Edenville disaster has exposed a major statewide concern. The actions taken by the key players over the next several years will determine whether Michigan’s dams receive the necessary attention or whether the conditions for the next failure are already taking shape.
[1] Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Michigan Dam Incident Response Review: An Analysis of the 2020 Edenville and Sanford Dam Failure Response (2022), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents /fema_michigan-dam-incident-response-review_report.pdf.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Dam Safety, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, https://www. michigan.gov/egle/about/organization/water-resources/dam-safety (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Michigan’s Dams Infographic, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy (2020), https://www.michigan.gov/egle/-/media/Project/Websites/egle/ Images/WRD/Dam-Safety/Infographic-2020-MI-Dams.jpg.
[8] Edenville Dam Failure: Frequently Asked Questions, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy (June 30, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/ Project/Websites/egle/Documents/Multi-Division/ Edenville-Dam/FAQ.pdf.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 et seq.
[12] Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.31501 et seq.
[13] Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.30701 et seq.
[14] Dam Safety, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, supra note 4.
[15] Dam Safety Rules and Regulations, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, https://www.michigan.gov/egle/about/organization /water-resources/dam-safety/rules-regs (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[16] Edenville Dam Failure: Frequently Asked Questions, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, supra note 8.
[17] Id.
[18] See id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Kelly House, As Consumers Mulls Selling 13 Dams, Some in Michigan Fear Another Disaster, Bridge Mich. (May 15, 2025), https://bridgemi.com/ michigan-environment-watch/consumers-mulls-selling-13-dams-some-michigan-fear-another-disaster/.
[22] Id.
[23] See id.
[24] Edenville Dam Failure: Frequently Asked Questions, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, supra note 8.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Robert Snell, Owners of Failed Midland-Area Dams File for Bankruptcy, Detroit News (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/ michigan/2020/08/04/owners-failed-midland-area-dams-file-bankruptcy/ 3289930001/.
[28] See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 1, at 13, 42.
[29] Teresa Homsi, Mid-Michigan Dam Restorations Are Picking Back Up, with Residents to Pay Nearly $218M, Mich. Pub. Radio (May 19, 2025), https://www.michiganpublic.org/environment-climate-change/2025-05-19/mid-michigan-dam-restorations-are-picking-back-up-with-residents-to-pay-nearly-218m.
[30] H.B. 5485, 103d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2026).
[31] Michigan Lawmakers Propose Sweeping Dam Safety Overhaul, MLive (Feb. 2026), https://www.mlive.com/environment/2026/02/michigan-lawmakers-propose-sweeping-dam-safety-overhaul.html.
[32] Michigan’s Dam Problem, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.michigan.gov/egle/newsroom/mi-environment/2025/10/21/michigans-dam-problem.
[33] Dam Risk Reduction Grant Program (DRRGP), Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, https://www.michigan.gov/egle/about/organization /water-resources/dam-safety/drrgp (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[34] Consumers Energy Reaches Agreement to Sell 13 Michigan Hydroelectric Dams, Consumers Energy (Sept. 9, 2025), https://www. consumersenergy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/2025/09/09/ consumers-energy-reaches-agreement-to-sell-13-michigan-hydroelectric-dams.
[35] Consumers Energy Asks State, Federal Regulators to Approve Sale of 13 Hydroelectric Dams, UpNorthLive, https://upnorthlive.com/news/local/ consumers-energy-asks-state-federal-regulators-to-approve-sale-of-13-hydroelectric-dams-river-dams-energy-electricity (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[36] About, Four Lakes Task Force, https://www.four-lakes-taskforce-mi.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
[37] Id.
[38] Supra Section II.B.3.
[39] Kelly House, 5 Things to Know as Michigan Lawmakers Try Again on Dam Safety Reforms, Bridge Mich. (Mar. 12, 2026), https://bridgemi.com/ michigan-environment-watch/5-things-to-know-as-michigan-lawmakers-try-again-on-dam-safety-reforms/.
[40] See Lester Graham, EGLE Grants Help Fund Southwest Michigan Dam Projects in What May Be the Last Year of Funding, Mich. Pub. Radio (May 31, 2025), https://www.michiganpublic.org/transportation-infrastructure/ 2025-05-31/egle-grants-help-fund-southwest-michigan-dam-projects-in-what-may-be-the-last-year-of-funding (noting that EGLE had received over $100 million in grant applications for just $14.9 million available that year).
[41] Mich. 21st Century Infrastructure Comm’n, 21st Century Infrastructure Commission Report 115 (2016), https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/ Websites/formergovernors/Folder10/21st_Century_Infrastructure_Commission_Final_Report_1.pdf.
[42] Michigan’s Dam Problem, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes, & Energy, supra note 32.