Environmental Destruction in Conflict: Legal Frameworks and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Recovery
Anna Nguyen
Introduction
In Tehran, citizens describe the sky as “apocalyptic.”[1] The U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran most recently hit oil deposits, triggering catastrophic environmental and public health effects.[2] The Red Crescent warned that the toxic chemicals may lead to acid rain and other major health hazards.[3] Further, the U.S has struck, and continues to threaten to strike, Kharg Island—one of Iran’s major oil hubs.[4]
Armed conflict has devastating impacts on human populations, and these impacts also extend to the natural environment. Bombardment, the destruction of infrastructure, and the contamination of natural resources have long-lasting environmental consequences that persist long after fighting ends. In particular, the destruction of natural resources during armed conflict undermines the ability of affected communities to recover and rebuild.[5]
Two other examples of ongoing destruction illustrate dependence on natural resources. First, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War illustrates how armed conflict can affect a nation’s environment and reliance on natural resources. Ukraine has historically relied immensely on fossil fuel as a major component of its energy infrastructure.[6] In a preliminary assessment from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the organization found that numerous attacks on gas reserves and coal deposits have damaged or destroyed these critical infrastructures.[7] Thus, the destruction has complicated Ukraine’s ability to maintain energy production during the conflict.
Second, the environmental destruction of Palestine demonstrates how disastrous the loss of natural resources is to human life. In Gaza, more than half of the agricultural land (57%) that is critical for feeding the community has been degraded because of Israeli bombardment and military operations.[8] Satellite images show the destruction of orchards, field crops, and vegetables.[9] A report from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) found that because of the major loss of Gaza’s vegetation, e.g. 82% of its major crops, food production at the previous scale is not possible.[10] Beyond the immediate loss of food, agriculture that provides a source of economic income for local communities has been eradicated, such as olive trees.[11] This destruction not only has disrupted food production but also undermined local economic resilience.
Natural resources are crucial to the transition to peace and stability post-conflict.[12] Access to natural resources are vital to the ability of governments to deliver services to their citizens post-conflict. This access also overarchingly contributes to the resilience and recovery of a nation after war.[13] This blog post examines some of the legal frameworks that may enable post-conflict recovery through the protection of the environment.
Legal Frameworks
The aforementioned destruction has placed immense strain and loss on communities. It is also clear that destruction would place immense strain on communities trying to recover and rebuild post-conflict. When natural resources that populations rely on for survival, e.g., fertile land, water sources, and energy, are destroyed, the path towards recovery becomes more difficult.
Recognizing these severe consequences, international law has addressed these harms by developing legal frameworks designed to limit environmental damage through armed conflict. Foundation for this protection comes from international humanitarian law.
Treaty law located in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions established the protection of the natural environment.[14] Article 35 of Protocol I prohibits widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.[15] Article 55 of Protocol I affirms that “care should be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.”[16] This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are “intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.”[17]
However, no states have been held responsible or accused under Articles 35 and 55 for environmental destruction.[18] The standard of widespread, long-term and severe damage is a high burden of proof, and typical battlefield damage is not covered under these Articles.[19] Further, key global players such as the United States and Iran have signed the Protocol but have not endorsed ratification, and a signature is not binding on a state unless it has been endorsed by ratification.[20]
Similarly, the provision 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibits “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (emphasis added).[21] The statute sets out the ICC’s jurisdiction and creates a cause of action to bring against individuals[22] for crimes associated with environmental damage. Nevertheless, because of the high bar of “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment,”[23] there have been no charges brought under the direct environmental aspect of 8(2)(b)(iv).[24]
The ICC, however, has previously brought charges related to environmental damage, though not under the direct environmental protection outlined in 8(2)(b)(iv). In 2009 and 2010, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. Al-Bashir was the former head of state of Sudan who was deposed in 2019.[25] The ICC’s case information states that, among several other war crimes, al-Bashir’s campaign contaminated the wells and water pumps of the towns that were attacked.[26] However, because al-Bashir is not in ICC custody, the case remains in the Pre-Trial stage.[27]
Additionally in 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants against leaders within the Russian Armed Forces (Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov).[28] The ICC determined there was “reasonable grounds to believe that the two suspects bear responsibility for missile strikes carried out by the forces under their command against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure . . . ”[29] The arrest warrants included numerous charges, one of which was under Article 8(2)(b)(iv), though this was for causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects rather than the direct environmental aspect.[30]
In 2016, the ICC announced a policy about their intent to focus on environmental destruction, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and illegal disposition of land.[31] While the policy paper was just an internal document, it solidified the ICC’s commitment to prosecute more environmental crimes.[32] More recently in December 2025, the ICC issued the “Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage through the Rome Statute,” which set out how the Office of the Prosecutor will ensure the statute is applied to crimes that involve environmental damage.[33] The policy also recognizes that the destruction in Ukraine and Palestine indicate that these crimes are often motivated by competition over natural resources (e.g. land); thus, the policy aims to address these root causes of conflict themselves.[34]
The goals of the ICC policies clearly lay out intent to prosecute environmental crimes. However, the 2016 ICC policy did not appear to create significant change.[35] One author concluded, based on ICC’s preliminary examinations, no investigations or prosecutions were brought for crimes where the environment was the aggravating circumstance in selection of cases.[36] After examining the 2019 and 2020 preliminary reports, this still continues to be true.[37] This is likely in part because the ICC policies are internal documents that create no legal rights.[38] To further advance the goals of the 2016 and 2025 ICC Policy Reports, the ICC could amend the Rome Statute to include a charge that specifically targets exploitation of natural resources and environmental damage, but with a lower threshold to meet. It is unclear how the Office of the Prosecutor could move forward here, however, since amendments to the Rome Statute need to be initiated by state parties.
Conclusion
Although these legal frameworks recognize the importance of protecting the environment, enforcement has been limited. As mentioned, the high standard required by both Protocol I and the Rome Statute make it difficult to bring charges for environmental damage as the three criteria (widespread, long-term, and severe) must be met,[39] and a lack of endorsed ratification by major global powers raises the enforcement of Protocol I into question. As a result, the destruction of natural resources—such as fertile land in Gaza and energy reserves in Ukraine—occur with few consequences for global actors or individuals. States having their resources destroyed without consequence has negative implications. For example, it does not dissuade such attacks if states and individuals cannot be held (at the very least, symbolically held) liable for natural resource destruction. Thus, this continues to enable states to commit genocide by targeting significant natural resources and destroying any ability for a community reestablish itself post-conflict.
Programs such as UNEP could help inform a nation about the extent of natural resource loss and coordinate environmental recovery. Additionally, establishing programs similar to the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) could provide mechanisms for communities to receive compensation for losses because of conflict. However, these efforts only can occur after the fact. While the effects of the ICC’s 2025 policy on addressing environmental damage remain to be seen, based on the lack of significant change from the 2016 ICC Policy, change seems unlikely without firmer implementation (e.g. amendment).
Overall, the limited use of the environmental provisions under international humanitarian law reveals a gap between recognizing the protection of the environment in international law and the more practical and urgent needs of communities trying to recover. In the aftermath of war, concerns with infrastructure destruction and human casualties are more immediate and direct. However, the environmental destruction in Palestine, Ukraine, and most recently Iran, demonstrates a need to reexamine this area of law. The degradation of natural resources will hinder long-term recovery and resilience as communities rebuild. Armed conflict does not end when fighting stops. Future legal frameworks should focus on strengthening the link between environmental damage and post-conflict recovery, ensuring that the preservation and restoration of natural resources become an integral part of international law.
[1] Deepa Parent, Dark, like our future: Iranians describe scenes of catastrophe after Tehran’s oil depots bombed, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 8, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/08/dark-like-our-future-iranians-describe-scenes-of-catastrophe-after-tehrans-oil-depots-bombed.
[2] ‘The Air is Unbreathable’: Tehran Shrouded in Cloud of Toxic Smoke After Israel Strikes Fuel Depots, TIME, (Mar. 8, 2026), https://time.com/7383099/iran-news-oil-strikes-tehran/.
[3] Id.
[4] Trump warns of more strikes on Iran’s Khrag Island, pressures allies to secure oil checkpoint, (Mar. 14, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-calls-allies-help-secure-strait-hormuz-iran-vows-step-up-retaliation-2026-03-15/.
[5] ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING, https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2026, 11:57 AM).
[6] Striving for Access, Security, and Sustainability: Ukraine’s Transition to a Modern and Decentralized Energy System, CSIS (Jul. 2, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/striving-access-security-and-sustainability.
[7] CONFLICT AND ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATORY, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE 13 (2024) https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-environmental-consequences-of-the-war-against-Ukraine-Preliminary-twelve-month-assessment-summary-and-recommendations.pdf.
[8] Reuters, UN: More than half of cropland in hungry Gaza is damaged, VOA NEWS (June 14, 2024), https://www.voanews.com/a/un-more-than-half-of-cropland-in-hungry-gaza-is-damaged/7655733.html.
[9] Id.
[10] Environmental damage in Gaza Strip harming human health, threatening long-term food and water security, UNEP, (Sep. 23, 2023), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/environmental-damage-gaza-strip-harming-human-health-threatening.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, Improving Natural Resource Management in Post-Conflict Countries, https://www.eli.org/environmental-peacebuilding/improving-natural-resource-management-post-conflict-countries (last visited Mar. 15, 2026, 11:58 AM).
[14] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 55, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3.
[15] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 35, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Britta Sjöstedt, Protecting War’s Unseen Environmental Damage, NORDIC J. INT’L L. 24 (2025).
[19] Id.
[20] ICRC, State Parties, IHL DATABASES, (last visited Mar. 15, 2026 12:57 PM) https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/state-parties?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries.
[21] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
[22] How the court works, ICC, (last visited Mar. 26, 2025) https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works.
[23] The issue is 1) that there must be intent and 2) the fact that “long-term” and “widespread” creates a high standard to meet. Id.
[24] Susannah Dibble, Prosecuting Crimes Related to the Environment: Development at the International Criminal Court, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environment-blog/prosecuting-crimes-related-environment-development-international-criminal. There have been charges brought for causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects, which is under article 8(2)(b)(iv), but not for environmental damage under 8(2)(b)(iv). See Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash and Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-ivanovich-kobylash-and.
[25] Omar al-bashir, COALITION FOR THE ICC, (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/omar-albashir.
[26] Int’l. Crim. Ct., The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case Information Sheet, ICC-02/05-01/09 (Jul. 2021) https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/AlBashirEng.pdf.
[27] Al Basir Case, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (last visited Mar. 15 2026, 12:00 PM) https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir.
[28] Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash and Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-ivanovich-kobylash-and.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Environmental destruction and land-grabbing, CICC, (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/global-challenges-ICC-environmental-destruction-landgrabbing.
[32] Ricardo Pereira, After the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation: Towards an International Crime of Ecocide?, CRIMINAL L. FORUM, (Apr. 20, 2020).
[33] Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute, (Dec 2025), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2025-12/2025-env-eng.pdf.
[34] Id.
[35] Ricardo Pereira, After the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation: Towards an International Crime of Ecocide?, CRIMINAL L. FORUM, (Apr. 20, 2020).
[36] Id.
[37] See Report on Preliminary Activities, ICC, (2018); Report on Preliminary Activities, ICC, (2019).
[38] Ricardo Pereira, After the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation: Towards an International Crime of Ecocide?, CRIMINAL L. FORUM, (Apr. 20, 2020).
[39] See infra discussion in Legal Frameworks.